Settle a problem:53
This document provides a technical analysis of the behavior change related to the masking of RADIUS shared secrets within the Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) graphical user interface (GUI). This change, tracked under enhancement ID CSCwn09816, was intentionally introduced in ISE version 3.1 and subsequent releases as a security hardening measure. The primary impact is the inability for administrators to view previously configured shared secrets for Network Access Devices (NADs). This document will detail the problem, analyze the rationale behind the change, and provide comprehensive operational procedures to manage NAD shared secrets effectively under this new security posture.
Upon upgrading to Cisco ISE version 3.1 or later, administrators have observed that the RADIUS shared secret field for all configured Network Devices (Work Centers > Network Resources > Network Devices
) is masked, typically displayed as a series of asterisks or dots. Previously, administrators had the ability to toggle the visibility of this secret, allowing for quick verification, troubleshooting, or copying for documentation purposes.
The core technical problem stemming from this change is the loss of a direct GUI method to retrieve an existing shared secret. This presents operational challenges in the following scenarios:
This behavior is by design and is associated with Cisco bug/enhancement ID CSCwn09816.
The change implemented under CSCwn09816 is not a defect but a deliberate security enhancement. Its purpose is to align Cisco ISE with industry best practices for credential management, such as those outlined in PCI-DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard). Storing secrets in a retrievable, plaintext format within a management interface is considered a significant security risk. By masking the secret permanently after its initial configuration, ISE mitigates the risk of unauthorized secret exposure through shoulder-surfing, screen captures, or compromised administrative accounts with read-only access.
Initial analysis of the ISE platform confirms there is no native GUI, CLI, or API mechanism to unmask or retrieve an existing RADIUS shared secret in its plaintext form. The change is fundamental to the platform’s security architecture moving forward. Therefore, the “solution” is not to revert the behavior but to adapt operational workflows to this more secure paradigm.
To address the operational challenges introduced by this enhancement, the following procedures are recommended for all network administration staff managing the Cisco ISE environment.
4.1 Adopt a Centralized Secret Management Policy
The fundamental principle moving forward is to treat RADIUS shared secrets as sensitive credentials that are set once and are not meant to be retrieved from the application.
4.2 Procedure for Addressing an Unknown Shared Secret
If a shared secret is unknown and a mismatch is suspected, the only authoritative procedure is to reset it. Direct retrieval is not possible.
Work Centers > Network Resources > Network Devices
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command.4.3 Leveraging Automation for Scalability
For managing secrets at scale, manual updates are inefficient and prone to error. We recommend leveraging automation.
GET
request via the API will not return the existing secret, a PUT
request can be used to set a new one.The masking of RADIUS shared secrets under CSCwn09816 is a permanent and beneficial security enhancement for the Cisco ISE platform. While it requires an adjustment to previous workflows, the mitigation of risk far outweighs the operational inconvenience. By adopting disciplined secret management practices—utilizing a centralized password vault as the source of truth and implementing a standardized procedure for resetting unknown secrets—organizations can maintain a robust and secure network access control environment.